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Policymaking involves trade-offs to ensure the 
best possible use of limited resources. Identifying 
and measuring the impacts – for example, health 
gains – of different policy alternatives helps 
decision makers with these trade-offs, and is a key 
component of policy analysis. The New Zealand 
Treasury’s approach to cost-benefit analysis 
includes CBAx, which is a toolkit for estimating 
the societal value of alternative policy options. 
A 2018 review showed increased quality of cost-
benefit analysis in budget proposals following the 
introduction of CBAx. In this article, we provide 
some context to CBAx developments and share 
insights from agencies’ practical experiences. We 
focus on the perspective of policy advisors using 
CBAx to undertake cost-benefit analysis, and touch 
on the application of the results to decision making. 
We conclude by outlining potential developments 
and inviting colleagues to make use of the CBAx 
toolkit to enhance cost-benefit analysis practices 
to better value policy impacts for New Zealanders.
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Cost–benefit analysis in New Zealand 
improved with CBAx
Cost–benefit analysis is a standard 
economic technique used internationally 
for assessing policy options (see Weimer 
and Vining, 2005; Boardman et al., 2018). 
In essence, cost-benefit analysis involves 
comparing alternative courses of action 
by identifying the expected societal 
impacts of the alternatives over time, and 
estimating the value of these impacts. In 
the New Zealand public sector, agencies are 
expected to undertake ex ante cost-benefit 
analysis in a regulatory impact assessment 
for legislative change, a business case, a 
budget funding proposal, and as required 
by governing legislation (such as for 
resource management policies). 
Views vary about the usefulness of 
doing cost-benefit analysis, and there are 
many challenges, as outlined in this article. 
Reasons in favour of undertaking cost-
benefit analysis include that it ‘forces the 
decision-maker to look at who the 
beneficiaries and losers are in both the 
spatial and temporal dimensions … and 
[insists] on all gains and losses of “utility” 
or “well-being” being counted [which] 
means that it forces the wider view on 
decision-makers’ (OECD, 2018 p.32). 
Cost–benefit analysis in New Zealand 
is not new. But, as with overseas experience, 
the lack of consistent usage, capability and 
standardisation are challenges (Dobes, 
Argyrous and Leung, 2015). Some agencies 
have undertaken cost-benefit analysis for 
many years (for example, in the transport 
sector). For other agencies, their practice 
in recent years has changed with the 
introduction in 2015 of CBAx, a toolkit for 
estimating the societal value of policy 
options. A 2018 review showed that the 
quality of cost-benefit analysis in Budget 
initiatives increased following the 
introduction of CBAx (NZIER, 2018). The 
review investigated the quality of the cost-
benefit analysis in a stratified random 
sample of 50 Budget initiatives over four 
Budgets, 2015–18, giving each analysis a 
score out of 10 (see Figure 1). 
The review showed that the main 
contribution of CBAx is not the modelling 
and monetisation in and of itself, but that 
CBAx requires agencies to be more 
systematic and robust in their policy 
thinking. The review saw improvements in 
the initial cost-benefit analysis steps, such 
as identifying a broader range of impacts, 
better problem definition, better 
quantification and more transparent 
assumptions. The review also raised a 
number of challenges, such as a need to 
improve the quality of the evidence 
provided for impacts and to not over-focus 
on the summary metrics. 
Agencies doubled the quality of their 
cost-benefit analysis advice over just a few 
years – a remarkable achievement (though 
admittedly this comes from a low base). 
This improvement in agency practice 
deserves acknowledgement. And it is 
encouraging, given the political context in 
which ministers increasingly seek policy 
advice that covers multidimensional 
impacts, long-term implications and cross-
sector solutions, and which is based on 
better use of data and evidence on what 
difference interventions make to New 
Zealanders’ lives. Measurement capability 
within agencies is weak (Productivity 
Commission, 2018); we are not 
underestimating the challenges that 
agencies face. 
Ethical assumptions
Before introducing CBAx, we set out here 
three of the major ethical assumptions 
underlying cost-benefit analysis. We do 
so to provide some context. Cost–benefit 
analysis is not ethically neutral or value 
free. This is not a criticism; the ethical 
assumptions underlying cost-benefit 
analysis should be considered as ‘features’, 
not ‘bugs’. But appreciating this context 
helps with interpreting the results of cost-
benefit analysis.
First, cost-benefit analysis is necessarily 
normative in the sense that it addresses the 
issue of what course of action we should 
take. In particular, cost-benefit analysis is 
consequentialist: it assumes that the course 
of action we should take depends on the 
consequences (or outcomes or impacts) of 
that course of action. 
Second, evidence and data have a 
central role in cost-benefit analysis, given 
the importance of outcomes for 
determining the recommended course of 
action. But gathering this evidence and 
data is not a purely empirical or positive 
exercise. The decision over what to measure, 
and what metrics to use, implies a particular 
view of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, or more generally 
a particular view of value.
Third, cost-benefit analysis is often 
silent on the issue of distribution. To infer 
from this that the best alternative is the one 
that maximises the aggregate benefits over 
costs would be to take a substantive 
position on justice in distribution. 
Again, bringing attention to these three 
particular underlying ethical assumptions 
should not be interpreted as a criticism. 
There are, however, alternative ethical 
assumptions that could be made. For 
example, it may seem obvious that the 
correct course of action depends on the 
impacts of that action. Consequentialism 
is certainly a prominent normative ethical 
theory, but it is by no means the only view. 
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Figure 1: Trends in mean score by CBAx status, Budgets 2015 - 2018
Source: NZIER, 2018
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Consequentialism’s most prominent rival 
is deontology. Deontological normative 
ethical theories claim that we can determine 
what course of action we should take 
directly, independently of the expected 
consequences of our action. According to 
deontology, the correct course of action is 
the one that conforms to certain norms, 
and often these norms are couched in 
terms of the rights and duties of individuals. 
For example, a proposal for compulsory 
organ donation might have more benefits 
than costs, but we might reject the proposal 
on the grounds that it violates a 
fundamental right to bodily integrity (and 
so rule out a proposal before we even begin 
to consider the impacts). Such reasoning 
involves deontological normative ethical 
theories. 
We revisit some of these underlying 
ethical assumptions of cost-benefit analysis 
later in this article. A lot of attention is 
given to the second ethical assumption 
noted above – the issue of value – and the 
challenge of capturing it. We turn to that 
issue in the next section.
What is CBAx? 
CBAx is a cost-benefit analysis toolkit 
developed by the New Zealand Treasury 
for considering a wide range of impacts 
across time and multiple dimensions. 
It is designed to improve cost-benefit 
analysis practice. In principle, cost-benefit 
analysis is simply a matter of providing an 
evaluation of policy alternatives. However, 
in practice, estimating the value of impacts 
can be challenging. 
CBAx is distinctive in that CBAx 
provides policy practitioners with a 
database of some New Zealand values, and 
standardises modelling – for example, 
standardising discounting of impacts over 
time. CBAx makes it easier and faster to do 
a cost-benefit analysis of options, and 
makes analysis more consistent, transparent 
and comparable for decision makers. 
At the core of CBAx is a spreadsheet to 
model benefits and costs: i.e., the positive 
and negative societal impacts, such as 
income and loneliness. But CBAx is more 
than a cost-benefit analysis spreadsheet. 
The CBAx approach involves the Treasury 
working alongside agencies to build 
capability and improve cost-benefit 
analysis practice – for example, through 
the CBAx community of practice. In 
addition to the spreadsheet model, the 
CBAx toolkit1 includes:
•	 the	CBAx Tool User Guidance, with tips 
for measuring fiscal and wider societal 
impacts based on agencies’ practical 
experiences (Treasury, 2019);
•	 the	 Treasury’s	 Guide to Social Cost 
Benefit Analysis (Treasury, 2015). This 
was assessed, alongside Australian and 
international guidelines, to ‘provide 
high quality, readable and practical 
guidance’ (Abelson, forthcoming, p.27);
•	 the	CBAx	wellbeing	domains	template,	
to set out a wide range of societal 
impacts of policy alternatives, whether 
these impacts can be monetised or not; 
and 
•	 additional	resources,	including	applied	
CBAx examples and the Australian 
Social Value Bank (Social Value 
International, 2019). 
Evaluating impacts
CBAx provides a systematic approach to 
cost-benefit analysis, with defined steps 
that can be applied in a fit-for-purpose way 
for a specific policy decision (see Figure 
2). However, CBAx is not intended to be 
a comprehensive toolkit to cover all of 
the steps in the policy cycle, from agenda 
setting to monitoring and evaluation. Cost–
benefit analysis can be used alongside 
other policy tools, such as multi-criteria 
decision analysis and distributional 
analysis.2 CBAx is particularly relevant 
when appraising the impacts of policy 
alternatives. (Thinking about impacts 
is also useful when identifying policy 
problems and potential policy options for 
intervening.) Policy advisors choose the 
analytical approaches, including whether 
to undertake cost-benefit analysis, and, if 
Figure 2: CBAx cost-benefit analysis steps
Source: The Treasury (2015), and with CBAx additions in The Treasury (2019)
1. Clarify the
problem or
opportunity.
2. Identify possible
policies, projects
or solutions.
Policy evaluation using CBA
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4. Check skills & budget
for procurement and
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doing this, whether to use CBAx.
The Treasury expects agencies to 
provide fit-for-purpose cost-benefit 
analysis to support policy proposals. We 
think of this as ‘pragmatic rigour’. So, what 
does a fit-for-purpose cost-benefit analysis 
cover? We start with dispelling potential 
misconceptions and set out what it is not. 
•	 It	 is	 not	 about	 monetising	 all	 the	
impacts. Ideally, all significant impacts 
are monetised, but that may not be 
possible. Indeed, only a subset of the 
impacts are expected to be monetised. 
A reverse analysis, to identify the 
assumptions needed to break even, may 
be the best that can be done; for 
example, due to weak evidence (covered 
later in the article).
•	 It	 is	not	a	one-size-fits-all	approach.	
The CBAx steps are adaptable. The 
approach can be varied to reflect the 
nature and significance of the options 
as well as the available policy resources, 
including common constraints of time 
and information. Also, in some cases, 
simpler cost-effectiveness analysis may 
be sufficient, or more complex 
modelling may be warranted.
•	 It	 is	 not	 just	 for	 economists	 or	
consultants. CBAx aims to empower 
agency policy advisors and make cost-
benefit analysis practicable. Agencies 
can use the comparable CBAx model 
for free, rather than pay for bespoke 
models. 
A simple way to approach CBAx is to 
work through the ‘IQM’ steps (Jensen, 
2019): 
•	 Identify	impacts widely. At a minimum, 
this involves developing the intervention 
logic, establishing a clear counterfactual3 
and identifying the main impacts. Many 
different people may be involved in 
identifying a range of impacts, including 
external stakeholders. Taking a longer-
term perspective brings into view 
preventive and intergenerational 
impacts. Thinking broadly about the 
impacts and interconnections can 
include consideration of path 
dependency and irreversibility (for 
example, the loss of species or entire 
ecosystems). Policy advisors’ sound 
professional judgement is needed to 
decide what to include and what to leave 
out. This is a key policy skill.
•	 Quantify impacts to the extent possible, 
relative to the counterfactual. This is 
usually resource intensive and the 
evidence base is often variable. An 
initial run of the CBAx model and 
sensitivity analysis can be helpful for 
adjusting efforts, so that effort focuses 
on impacts that matter. This starts with 
available information, and then goes 
on to fill information gaps for 
significant impacts. 
•	 Monetise	the significant impacts where 
possible. It can be useful in the policy 
development process to monetise a 
wide range of impacts to clarify and test 
assumptions and sensitivities. After 
thinking widely about the impacts and 
ways of measuring these, agencies can 
choose the most appropriate impact 
measures. For the final results, it is 
better to be selective and focus on 
monetising the significant impacts, to 
avoid double counting and avoid 
reduced confidence in the results from 
the inclusion of tenuous, weakly 
evidenced impacts that boost the 
overall ratios. 
The IQM steps build on each other and 
increase in difficulty. In reality, cost-benefit 
analysis tends to be iterative. Impacts 
should be identified and quantified to the 
extent possible. It is not necessary (or 
indeed possible) to monetise every impact. 
However, to forego a cost-benefit analysis 
when evidence of impacts is relevant and 
available would be to forego an opportunity 
to achieve a good outcome, and itself a 
potential ethical lapse. 
Beyond fiscals to wellbeing 
The Treasury released the first CBAx 
version in October 2015, and agencies 
first applied CBAx to funding proposals 
in the 2016 Budget. At the time, ministers, 
including the minister of finance, took 
a ‘social investment approach’, which 
sought better outcomes from policies and 
spending.4 While cost-benefit analysis was 
a widely accepted technique for measuring 
impacts, views varied about what impacts 
to include. For example, as Boston and Gill 
note: 
At the heart of these concerns [about 
the social investment model] is the 
failure, at least thus far, of ministers and 
their advisers to incorporate an 
appropriately broad range of costs and 
benefits into their evaluation of specific 
policy interventions. While fiscal 
objectives are unquestionably 
important, they are not a sufficient 
measure of overall performance. 
(Boston and Gill, 2017, p.24) 
This comment reinforces the point 
made above, that the choice over what to 
measure is an assumption of what is 
valuable, and a substantive ethical and 
policy choice.
Concerns such as a too-narrow focus 
on fiscal impacts shaped the design of 
CBAx from the start. Many values in the 
CBAx database are fiscal impacts for 
government, reflecting the fact that these 
values are easier to access and are already 
in dollar terms. But CBAx goes beyond 
fiscal impacts. For example, the Australian 
Social Value Bank social impact values are 
available (outside the CBAx database) 
under a sub-licence.5 In 2018 CBAx 
included Housing New Zealand subjective 
wellbeing values. The subjective wellbeing 
values offer opportunities to value wider 
impacts, and could be further expanded 
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using New Zealand data such as the New 
Zealand General Social Survey and Te 
Kupenga (Grimes, 2019). Subjective 
wellbeing could contribute to policy in a 
number of ways (O’Donnell et al., 2014). 
For example, it could potentially be used 
as a common measure across a wide variety 
of impacts (Layard, 2016). Associate 
Professor Jan-Emmanuel De Neve at the 
University of Oxford has developed policy 
tools to apply subjective wellbeing 
weightings for different wellbeing 
domains.6 
Users need to be aware that different 
CBAx values monetise different types of 
impacts and are derived from different 
methodologies: fiscal savings to the 
government from avoided costs of diabetes 
($4,075 per year), for example, or the 
subjective wellbeing value to an individual 
of living in a cold house for every point 
change on a 0–3 point scale (–$6,991 per 
year – the more often a house is cold, the 
more subjective wellbeing is reduced). In 
early 2019 the CBAx impact values, and the 
robustness of these, attracted public debate 
(Jensen, 2019). Users should review the 
source data that can be accessed through 
links in the database. 
For many government interventions, 
there is no market value for the relevant 
impacts. We therefore need to use non-
market valuation methodologies to derive 
a value. The a range of methodologies 
include: revealed preferences (estimating 
implicit value through related market 
prices and travel costs); contingent 
valuation (survey stated preferences of 
willingness to pay); discrete choice 
experiments; value transfer (from other 
primary studies); and subjective wellbeing 
(life satisfaction regressions) (Boardman 
et al., 2018; OECD, 2018). There is no ‘one 
right’ valuation methodology; each has 
strengths and weaknesses (Fujiwara, 2016). 
Surveys to estimate individuals’ willingness 
to pay can have a number of biases, and 
good survey design and practice are critical. 
Confidence increases when a value is 
estimated similarly using different 
methodologies. However, sometimes policy 
advisors will be fortunate to have even one 
valuation. 
In general, cost-benefit analysis values 
impacts on human wellbeing. The view 
that human wellbeing exhausts what 
constitutes the good impacts is an ethical 
assumption that ought to be borne in mind 
when interpreting the results; it is plausible 
that good and bad consequences are 
broader than just the impact on human 
wellbeing. For example, the preservation 
of an endangered species might be an 
intrinsically good impact, irrespective of 
any implications for human wellbeing. 
The view that human wellbeing should 
be interpreted as the satisfaction of 
preferences (measured, for example, by 
willingness to pay for benefits or to avoid 
costs) is a further ethical assumption. The 
preference-satisfaction view of wellbeing 
is just one of three standard views of 
wellbeing, the other two being the hedonist 
view (wellbeing consists in a certain mental 
state) and the objective list view (there is a 
list of certain things such as health and 
education that make an individual’s life go 
well). 
Note, though, that CBAx is pluralistic 
and does not constrain the user’s choice of 
impacts, measurement or valuation 
methodology. It does, however, require the 
user to be transparent about these and the 
assumptions. Users can freely add other 
impacts to those already included. 
The Treasury updated CBAx in 2018 to 
support Budget wellbeing analysis by 
categorising specific impacts, such as 
changes in income, within the wellbeing 
domains, such as ‘jobs and earnings’, from 
the Treasury’s Living Standard Framework.7 
New Zealand hosted the Third International 
Conference on Wellbeing and Public Policy 
in September that year, and has gained 
international attention through the prime 
minister’s and the minister of finance’s 
emphasis on wellbeing, with much 
attention being given to the 2019 Wellbeing 
Budget.8 The OECD’s OECD Economic 
Surveys: New Zealand 2019 provided a 
wellbeing focus and included information 
on CBAx as a mechanism for including 
wellbeing analysis in policy development 
(OECD, 2019, p.103). Durand and Exton 
covered CBAx in the Global Happiness and 
Well-being Progress Report (Durand and 
Exton, 2019, p.159). Measurement is one 
of the challenges for New Zealand 
becoming the leading light in the wellbeing 
approach to public policy. As Weijers and 
Morrison note, ‘The critical issues in the 
measurement of wellbeing are what to 
measure, how to measure and how to 
construct a model of wellbeing out of those 
measures’ (Weijers and Morrison, 2018, 
p.6). 
Co-design – the discount rate example
Since its introduction, the role of the CBAx 
toolkit has evolved and the government’s 
requirements to use it for Budget 
purposes have changed. Initially there 
were structural changes to the model. The 
model is now structurally stable and the 
changes are mainly to the database. The 
CBAx toolkit, while led by the Treasury, 
is collaborative and co-designed with 
agencies. The CBAx database is an example 
of this partnership. All of the values in 
the database are supplied from publicly 
available agency information. These are 
not Treasury values, but the Treasury has 
a system enabler role, making it easier for 
users to access these values, standardising 
the values to a common year, and allowing 
for consistent assumptions across 
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initiatives (for example, by using the same 
assumption about the value of a GP visit). 
The partnership has not been without 
tensions. For example, the discount rate9 
was a point of disagreement early on. 
Agencies, and ministers, were concerned 
that the Treasury public sector discount 
rate was too high (8% real at the time, now 
6%), rendering longer-term impacts 
inconsequential. The tensions led to a 
review of the approaches to setting the 
discount rate. The Treasury working paper 
concluded that there is no completely 
objective way of determining public sector 
discount rates; value judgements and 
assumptions are inevitable (Creedy and 
Passi, 2017). The discount rate reflects 
three separate things: time preference, risk 
and the opportunity cost of capital. The 
appropriate choice of discount rate to 
reflect these three factors is still subject to 
considerable disagreement amongst 
theorists and cost-benefit analysis 
practitioners. To address the concerns, the 
Treasury changed the design of CBAx to 
automatically produce a sensitivity analysis 
including the standard rate and an 
alternative rate. Jonathan Boston welcomes 
CBAx sensitivity analysis, and proposes a 
lower discount rate ‘especially for periods 
exceeding thirty years and when there are 
risks of catastrophic or irreversible 
consequences’ (Boston, 2017, p.129). CBAx 
is designed so that agencies are able to 
change the discount rate (though for 
comparability reasons agencies are 
expected to retain the two CBAx rates of 
6% and 3% respectively).10 The Treasury 
reviews the CBAx models submitted as part 
of Budget proposals to assess whether the 
relative ranking of different Budget 
initiatives would change under different 
discount rate assumptions. To date, the 
relative ranking of initiatives on their ‘50-
year return on investment’ is insensitive to 
3% or 6% rates. 
Lessons learned from practice
The collaborative approach to developing 
CBAx also includes the sharing of user 
experiences and troubleshooting. We share 
some of the lessons here, which all relate 
to the central themes of what to measure 
and how to measure it.
A common problem is for policy 
advisors to think that the impacts they 
know the most about, or that are the policy 
aim, are the most important impacts. Some 
agencies, for example Pharmac, are tasked 
with delivering outcomes within a 
particular domain (health) and have 
focused their perspective accordingly 
(Alsop	and	Crausaz,	2017).	But	impacts	on	
employment or social services may be the 
most significant impact from a particular 
health policy. These are not traditionally 
considered when undertaking a cost-
benefit analysis from a health sector 
perspective, and may be overlooked 
(Neumann et al., 2017). The requirement 
in CBAx for broader consideration of 
impacts using a societal perspective 
encourages agencies to work with others 
outside their immediate sector, putting 
people – not agencies or sectors – at the 
centre of the analysis. 
CBAx encourages agencies to identify 
impacts comprehensively, including fiscal 
impacts for government, such as hospital 
cost savings, and wider wellbeing impacts, 
such as less physical pain. While the costs 
and benefits to government tend to be the 
easiest to quantify (because they are often 
already measured in monetary terms), they 
may not be the most important impacts 
based on the intervention analysis. 
A variety of frameworks can help 
agencies identify the relevant wellbeing 
impacts. Some agencies, such as Sport New 
Zealand, have outcome frameworks for 
their policy area; other agencies, including 
the Ministry for Women, provide 
population-based frameworks, such as 
‘Bringing Gender In’.11 CBAx encourages 
agencies to use these, and to think beyond 
sector-specific frameworks. The Treasury’s 
Living Standard Framework covers 12 
multidimensional wellbeing domains 
(such as health, housing, safety, 
environment). CBAx categorises specific 
impacts according to these 12 wellbeing 
domains (there is also an ‘other’ category, 
as there may be impacts that are not 
captured by the 12 domains). Total 
economic value is another framework that 
people can apply in combination with 
sector outcomes and the wellbeing 
domains. It distinguishes use values 
(including direct use, indirect use and 
option value) and non-use values 
(including existence, bequest and altruistic 
value). Non-use values can be relevant for 
environmental policies (OECD, 2018).  
Policy practitioners often raise concerns 
that the evidence base for impacts is weak. 
The 2018 review highlighted this problem. 
In spite of this limitation, practitioners can 
at least do the first step of identifying the 
expected impacts and the intervention 
logic, and it can be useful to apply the 
CBAx model to undertake a reverse analysis 
(see Treasury, 2019). This looks at what 
assumptions are necessary for the option 
to be worthwhile; the plausibility of these 
assumptions can then be considered and 
sensitivity tested. Reverse analysis focuses 
on one, or maybe two, key expected 
impacts. Often people have enough 
experience to draw on to assess how 
reasonable or unreasonable those 
assumptions would be. Usually, this can 
also provide a basis for developing an ex 
post evaluation of the policy if it goes 
ahead, thereby building a better evidence 
base over time, as well as an ability to 
change approach if the assumptions turn 
out not to hold. 
While many challenges remain, there 
has been a strong drive towards better data, 
evidence and quantification in recent years. 
New Zealand can use international 
evidence, such as the Environmental 
Valuation Reference Inventory,12 the United 
Kingdom What Works centres13 and the 
Washington State Institute of Public Policy 
benefit–cost studies.14 Statistics New 
Zealand and agencies have made significant 
progress in developing the Integrated Data 
Infrastructure,15 which is a large research 
database that holds microdata about 
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people and households. The Hub16 provides 
access to social science research and helpful 
guidance on how to assess evidence 
(Superu, 2017). The CBAx guidance 
includes links to such sources.
The monetisation of impacts – valuing 
of impacts in dollar terms – can be 
challenging. In many situations agencies 
will not have the time or resources to 
develop values. This is where the CBAx 
database can be particularly helpful. The 
database aims to:
•	 make	 New	 Zealand	 values	 publicly	
available and easily accessible for users;
•	 standardise	 the	 values	 used	 for	
particular impacts: for example, the 
value used for the statistical value of life 
($5,000,000);
•	 make	the	values	consistent:	for	example,	
by adjusting all values to a common 
year, including values that users add 
themselves;
•	 increase	the	monetisation	of	impacts	
and thereby the comparability across 
multiple dimensions of wellbeing; and
•	 make	 undertaking	 a	 cost-benefit 
analysis more efficient by reducing the 
research costs and time.
The CBAx database helps with 
standardising; however, policy advisors 
need to use their professional judgement 
of what the most appropriate values are 
and make any variation transparent, 
including the basis for the variation. If the 
CBAx database misses values relevant for 
a particular proposal, agencies can add in 
values that they have found outside CBAx. 
These may be values from agency statistics 
or adapted from overseas studies. In using 
the values, agencies need to look at the 
quality and nature of the source data, make 
any adjustments for the particular proposal, 
and document the rationale and method 
for making adjustments.
Acknowledging the practical challenges 
and imperfections, the question is whether 
the policy practices and advice, and 
ultimately the decisions, are better with, or 
without, CBAx. In the words of one agency 
policy advisor: ‘If you care about outcomes, 
get comfortable with this discipline.’
Applying CBAx results to decision making 
The purpose of undertaking a cost-benefit 
analysis using CBAx is to inform decisions 
by measuring the impacts of different 
options within a policy or across different 
initiatives, and helping decision makers 
make trade-offs. The CBAx results include: 
•	 the	 standard	 cost-benefit analysis 
summary metrics, such as net present 
value for five, ten and 50 years and the 
benefit–cost ratio using two standard 
methods (Abelson, forthcoming), with 
automatic sensitivity analysis of the 
discount rate (6% and 3% currently); 
•	 impacts	for	government	(mainly	fiscal	
impacts) and for society overall;
•	 a	chart	of	the	present	value	of	impacts	
across the wellbeing domains;
•	 the	strength	of	the	evidence	base	for	
specific impacts (qualitative contextual 
information that does not affect the 
calculations);
•	 the	present	value	for	specific	impacts,	
which is helpful for focusing on the 
impacts and assumptions that matter 
the most;
•	 qualitative	 indication	 of 	 the	
unmonetised impacts, and key 
assumptions.
The simplest and most visible way to 
use the results of cost-benefit analysis 
would be to assess and rank the options 
according to their performance against the 
(monetised) summary metrics, such as net 
present value, benefit–cost ratio and return 
on investment. However, the Treasury has 
used CBAx results to inform value-for-
money judgements ( including 
unmonetised impacts) and considered this 
alongside a range of decision factors.
The Treasury encourages consideration 
of all impacts, whether these are monetised 
or not, and factors the evidence base into 
the judgement about the relative value of 
options. This is a broader value-for-money 
judgement than the summary metrics. For 
example, option A with a return on 
investment of ‘2’ (i.e., $2 net societal 
benefits for every $1 invested) may be 
preferred over an option B with a return 
of ‘3’, if option A’s evidence base gives 
greater confidence in the return or if the 
unmonetised impacts are significant. 
In many cases there is a default and 
implicit equal weighting of all impacts. 
This can be changed. There may be various 
reasons for greater emphasis and weight 
on some impacts than on others. Previously 
we shared the example of using subjective 
wellbeing information to weight wellbeing 
domains (Government of Dubai, 2018). 
Decision makers may weight impacts for 
different people differently: for example, 
place higher weight on impacts for children 
or disadvantaged groups (see distribution 
below). A third possibility could be greater 
weighting on catastrophic or irreversible 
impacts (Boston, 2017). Impact weightings 
are best as a distinct step; they should be 
transparent, include sensitivity analysis 
and inform (not make) political 
judgements. 
In addition, there are a range of decision 
factors and criteria, other than value for 
money, that inform policy advice. 
Consequently, a good or bad cost-benefit 
result is not deterministic and does not 
preclude decision making on other grounds. 
The nature and magnitude of the impacts 
can be overshadowed by other factors, such 
as:
•	 affordability	 (for	 government	 and	
users) – often scaling is considered;
•	 evidence	strength	and	planned	ex	post	
evaluation; 
•	 collaboration	or	fit	within	a	package	of	
initiatives;
•	 implementation	 readiness	 and	
practicality;
•	 alignment	with	ministerial	priorities	–	a	
key driver in practice;
•	 rights,	if	not	considered	earlier	in	the	
policy process;
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•	 distributional	effects	–	who	is	affected	
matters.
The last two factors – rights and 
distribution – may be considered as 
separate steps from the cost-benefit 
analysis. Regarding the last factor, as noted 
earlier, cost-benefit analysis is often silent 
on the issue of distribution. 
Cost–benefit analysis does not 
(necessarily) require recommending the 
alternative that maximises the sum total 
of benefits over costs – i.e., overall net 
benefits (the ‘efficient’ policy alternative); 
to do so would be to make a substantive 
ethical choice. Kaldor-Hicks potential 
Pareto improvements occur when the 
benefits of a proposal outweigh the costs 
so that it is theoretically possible for the 
winners to compensate the losers such 
that no one is worse off and at least 
someone is better off (see Hausman, 
McPherson	and	Satz,	2017;	Boardman	et	
al., 2018). Note, though, that a Kaldor-
Hicks potential Pareto improvement does 
not imply that the compensation is 
actually paid. To recommend the policy 
option that maximises the aggregate net 
benefits (with or without weights applied 
to individuals) is to apply the ethical 
theory of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism 
ignores what Rawls (1973) terms the 
‘moral separateness of persons’. While it 
may be permissible for an individual to 
trade off costs and benefits in their own 
life, it is illegitimate (so it is claimed) to 
aggregate costs and benefits across 
individuals.17 
Issues of distributive justice should be 
considered alongside the results of cost-
benefit analysis. And consideration of 
issues of distributive justice are compatible 
with the CBAx framework. Different 
theories of distributive justice may be 
relevant, depending on the policy case.18 
Policymakers could, for example, 
recommend the policy option that:
•	 allocates	 the	greatest	benefits	 to	 the	
worst-off  members of society 
(prioritarianism) (see Parfit, 1997); 
•	 allocates	 some	 minimum	 level	 of	
benefits to each individual 
(sufficientarianism) (see Frankfurt, 
1987);
•	 ensures	people	receive	the	costs	and	
benefits they are personally responsible 
for, and allocates all other costs and 
benefits equally (luck egalitarianism) 
(see Dworkin, 1981a, 1981b). 
Conclusion – incentivising better practices
CBAx can contribute to better valuing of 
impacts and better policy practices. CBAx 
challenges the view that cost-benefit 
analysis is too difficult and time consuming 
for policy advisors to do. It offers a practical 
way forward to make cost-benefit analysis 
easier and less resource intensive. It takes 
a broad perspective on impacts and makes 
different initiatives comparable, thereby 
facilitating trade-off discussions.
Mandatory cost-benefit analysis 
requirements have provided impetus and 
practical insight for the development of the 
CBAx toolkit, using a ‘learning-by-doing’ 
approach. The Treasury and agencies have 
invested in the development and use of 
CBAx. Agencies have demonstrated that 
they can do better cost-benefit analysis 
with CBAx than without CBAx. CBAx 
allows for more robust, transparent and 
comparable evaluation of the broader 
impacts of policy options. So, where to 
from here? User feedback matters – it 
incentivises public sector behaviours and 
policy practice. 
The Treasury has a key role, one not just 
limited to providing the CBAx toolkit and 
setting requirements. Importantly, the 
Treasury has a role in making use of agency 
CBAxs and in providing feedback to 
agencies, both on the agency analysis and 
on how this has been used by the Treasury. 
If it is not clear to agencies what they can 
do better, or it is unclear if their analysis 
influences Treasury advice, they lack 
incentives to undertake and improve their 
use of CBAx.
Agency policy leaders play several 
important roles. First, they set the 
expectations for staff of what analysis to 
undertake in support of policy advice. 
Internal agency expectations for when to 
use CBAx may need to be explicit. Second, 
they are responsible for the capability build 
that is needed to make staff well placed to 
undertake quantitative analysis. Third, they 
can support the change agents in their 
organisations. Often one or two key people 
drive the change in practice, and they need 
support to challenge the accepted practices 
and to build the capability to adopt new 
practices.
Agency behaviour is strongly driven by 
ministers. Ministers set expectations, for 
example via Cabinet circulars. Ministerial 
demand for, and use of, advice incentivises 
officials (Productivity Commission, 2018). 
Demand for advice on the nature and value 
of the impacts, and on the comparable 
value across wider policy options, provides 
incentives for agencies to make use of 
CBAx. 
One possible scenario is that CBAx, 
while useful and supportive of the strategic 
direction in the public sector, dies from 
lack of demand and use. Another scenario 
is that New Zealand policymakers (and 
others) embrace CBAx and take up the 
challenge to build capability and 
continually improve the toolkit and policy 
practices. One practical action could be for 
the public sector, academia, the community 
sector and the private sector to contribute 
to the publicly available CBAx database 
with robust values, measures and 
methodologies, thereby building a public 
asset. This could include subjective 
wellbeing measures, as encouraged by 
Arthur Grimes. Officials and academics 
could work together to contribute to this 
fast-growing area in wellbeing economics, 
and to apply wellbeing economics to public 
policymaking (Grimes, 2019). As with 
neural pathways, so with CBAx – use it or 
lose it. We invite policy practitioners and 
decision makers to use CBAx to value 
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